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Corporate Corruption & the New Gold 
Mine 
HOW THE DODD-FRANK ACT OVERINCENTIVIZES 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 It 
had debts of $613 billion against total assets of $639 billion, 
and its bankruptcy filing stands as the largest in the United 
States.2 On the following day, the U.S. government seized 
control of American International Group (AIG), one of the 
world’s largest insurers, in an $85 billion deal that “signaled 
the intensity of its concerns about the danger a collapse could 
pose to the financial system.”3 Federal Reserve Vice Chairman 
Donald Kohn stated that the failure of AIG posed “unacceptably 
large” risks to “consumers, municipalities, small business . . . as 
well as the risks to the wider economy,” and in essence, provided 
a “too big to fail” rationale to support the federal government’s 
$85 billion bailout.4 To some, this troubled financial state 
represented the “worst economy since the Great Depression.”5  
  
 1 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s Bankruptcy Information, EPIQ SYS., 
http://chapter11.epiqsystems.com/LBH/Project/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).  
 2 Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, MARKET 
WATCH (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-
613-billion-debt?siteid=rss. 
 3 Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. 
Hilsenrath, U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as 
Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1. 
 4 Mark Felsenthal, Fed’s Kohn: AIG Too Big to Fail, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2009), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52446C20090305. A bank or financial institution is 
“too big to fail” when it is so large and interconnected with other financial institutions that 
its failure could set off a “chain reaction.” FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF 
REPORT: GOVERNMENTAL RESCUES OF “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2 
(2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0831-
Governmental-Rescues.pdf. 
 5 See Timothy Geithner, Sec’y, Dep’t of Treasury, Address at Congressional 
Hispanic Caucus Institute Conference (Sept. 13, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg849.aspx); Lori Montgomery, 
New Economic Face Is Still Familiar, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2010, at A12; Barack 
Obama, President, United States, Remarks by the President at a Reception for 
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This economic crisis led to widespread support for 
changes in the financial regulatory system.6 President Barack 
Obama, when commenting on twenty-first-century financial 
regulatory reform, stated, “It is indisputable that one of the 
most significant contributors to our economic downturn 
was . . . the lack of adequate regulatory structures to prevent 
abuse and excess.”7 In response to the lack of such regulatory 
structures, Democratic Representative Barney Frank and 
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Chris Dodd proposed a 
financial regulatory overhaul.8 President Obama signed the 
resulting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) on July 21, 2010.9  
The Dodd-Frank Act faced fierce resistance and nearly 
unanimous Republican opposition.10 Critics of the Dodd-Frank 
Act claim it is a “radical expansion of the federal government 
that will hurt small businesses, community banks, and 
everyday taxpayers”11 and that the “new and expanded 
regulations . . . will limit the ability of banks . . . to extend 
credit.”12 Others argue that the Dodd-Frank Act is not strong 
  
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal (Sept. 16, 2010) (transcript available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/16/remarks-president-a-reception-
connecticut-attorney-general-richard-blume) [hereinafter White House Transcript]. 
 6 Jack Ewing, Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regulatory_reform/index.html 
(last updated July 19, 2011). 
 7 Barack Obama, President, United States, Remarks by the President on 
Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/) [hereinafter Obama, 
Remarks]. 
 8 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).  
 9 See Presidential Statement on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 617 (July 21, 2010) 
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act). 
 10 See Silla Brush, Dodd to Unveil Financial Legislation on Monday; No GOP 
Support Expected, HILL (Mar. 14, 2010, 9:25 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/ 
senate/86677-dodd-to-unveil-financial-legislation-monday-no-gop-support-expected 
(reporting that Senator Dodd’s financial regulatory proposals are not expected to have 
Republican support); see also Jim Kuhnhenn, Historic Financial Overhaul Signed to 
Law by Obama, DAILY CALLER (July 21, 2010, 3:08 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2010/ 
07/21/obama-poised-to-sign-sweeping-financial-overhaul/ (stating that the law passed 
“despite nearly unanimous Republican opposition”). 
 11 Don Seymour, Dodd-Frank: A Radical Expansion of Government That 
Won’t Prevent Future Bailouts, FREEDOM PROJECT (July 16, 2010, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.freedomproject.org/blog/dodd-frank-radical-expansion-government-wont-
prevent-future-bailouts. 
 12 Ryan Grim, Wall Street Opposes Wall Street Reform, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 28, 2010, 12:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/28/wall-street-opposes-
wall_n_627870.html (quoting Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n to Members of Congress, 
June 28, 2010). 
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enough to revive the nation’s economic health.13 Proponents, 
however, praise the Dodd-Frank Act as legislation that “marks 
the end of more than a generation in which the prevailing 
posture of Washington toward the financial industry was largely 
one of hands-off cheering, evidenced by steady deregulation,” 
and hail the Act as a “clear turning point, highlighting . . . [a] 
renewed reliance on government to protect the little guy.”14  
Despite the cloud of political controversy surrounding 
the Dodd-Frank Act, President Obama has firmly held that this 
overhaul of the financial regulatory system “place[s] rules that 
will allow our markets to promote innovation while 
discouraging abuse.”15 In an effort to help discourage such 
abuse, the Dodd-Frank Act includes a new whistleblower 
protection provision and also amends preexisting provisions to 
provide significant monetary incentives to potential 
whistleblowers.16 The new whistleblower provision drastically 
expands preexisting whistleblower legislation, primarily by 
expanding the scope of persons prohibited from taking 
retaliatory action and the scope of persons protected from 
retaliatory action. This note will examine two aspects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision: its whistleblower 
bounty program and its antiretaliation statute. It argues that 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions overincentivize 
whistleblowing by providing excessive and unnecessary 
bounties, and by granting expansive whistleblower protection 
to too large a scope of individuals. In effect, the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s whistleblower laws transform corporate corruption into a 
“gold mine”17 by giving individuals the opportunity to reap 
enormous benefits from reporting alleged violations. 
  
 13 See Gretchen Morgenson, Strong Enough for Tough Stains?, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2010, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/business/ 
27gret.html (stating that the Dodd-Frank Act “fails completely” in curbing “dangerous 
risk taking by institutions and cut[ting] big and interconnected financial entities down 
to size,” and that “the nation’s financial industry will still be dominated by a handful of 
institutions that are too large, too interconnected and too politically powerful to be 
allowed to go bankrupt if they make unwise decisions or make huge wrong-way bets”). 
 14 Ewing, supra note 6. 
 15 Obama, Remarks, supra note 7. 
 16 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1514A(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].  
 17 The “gold mine” metaphor incorporated into this note’s title was inspired 
by Letter from the Association of Corporate Counsel, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that as a result of 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions, “[f]raudulent misconduct, the bane of 
good compliance systems, then becomes the gold mine”).  
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Part I will discuss the preexisting whistleblower 
protection and bounty provisions. Part II will examine the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s amendments to the preexisting 
whistleblower laws, as well as its own antiretaliation statute. 
Part III will discuss the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower 
bounty program and argue that it is likely to be ineffective in 
furthering the Act’s goals of encouraging individuals to report 
tips of a “higher quality.”18 Part IV will analyze the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s antiretaliation provision in light of judicial interpretation 
of similar provisions contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and 
argue that Dodd-Frank’s dramatic expansion of the scope of 
antiretaliation laws has damaging effects. Finally, Part V will 
discuss suggestions and recommendations for the future. 
I. PREEXISTING WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND 
BOUNTY PROVISIONS 
Before the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, several 
statutes already protected whistleblowers “who report[] illegal 
or wrongful activities of his employer or fellow employees”19 and 
provided for rewarding such informants with bounties. Such 
provisions include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,20 the False 
Claims Act,21 the Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower 
provision,22 and the Insider Trading and Securities 
Enforcement Act of 1988.23 These statutes, however, only 
protect whistleblowers in narrow circumstances and provide 
weaker bounty incentives, both of which were imprudently 
expanded by Dodd-Frank. 
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), employees 
who provide information or assist in an investigation regarding 
conduct that they reasonably believe is a violation of any rule 
of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) or “any provision 
of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders”24 are 
  
 18 Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Larger Bounties Spur Surge in Fraud Tips, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2010, at C3 (quoting SEC official Stephen Cohen when writing that 
“[t]he goal is not just to get more tips, we want to get more high-quality tips”). 
 19 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1596 (6th ed. 1990).  
 20 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006). 
 21 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006). 
 22 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2006). 
 23 Id. 
 24 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 
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protected from discharge, demotion, suspension, harassment, 
or any other form of discrimination by their employers.25 A 
whistleblower alleging an injury from a discriminatory or 
retaliatory act must make a prima facie showing that his 
whistleblowing behavior was a “contributing factor” to such 
act.26 If the whistleblower-employee prevails in the action, he is 
entitled to compensatory relief, including back pay with 
interest, reinstatement to the same seniority status the 
employee would have had but for the employee’s act of 
discrimination, and compensation for any special damages 
incurred, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.27 
Although SOX protects whistleblowers from retaliation, 
it applies only when the whistleblower provides information to, 
or the investigation is conducted by, “a federal regulatory 
enforcement agency or law,” a congressional committee or 
member, or an individual “with supervisory authority over the 
employee.”28 SOX is further limited to apply only to publicly 
traded companies.29 
B. The False Claims Act 
The False Claims Act (FCA) similarly protects 
whistleblowers from retaliatory action. It prohibits an 
employer from discharging, demoting, suspending, harassing, 
or otherwise discriminating against the whistleblowing 
  
 25 Id. § 1514A(a). 
 26 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006). See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 
1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the persuasiveness of the EEOC’s guidance that 
“any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to 
deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity” is prohibited 
(quoting EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008 (1998))); Collins v. 
Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (ruling that a 
two-week span between the whistleblower’s complaints of alleged violations and her 
termination was sufficient to establish circumstances suggesting that the protected 
activity “was a contributing factor to the unfavorable personnel action” for summary 
judgment purposes). 
 27 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(A)-(C). Once a party has established its 
entitlement to an award of attorneys’ fees, the court must determine what is 
reasonable. Van Asdale v. Int’l Game, Tech., No. 3:04-CV-703-RAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46725, at *21 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2010). Under federal law, reasonable attorneys’ 
fees are generally calculated using the “lodestar” method based on the number of hours 
the attorney worked. Id. 
 28 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(C). 
 29 The provision prohibits any company with a class of securities “registered 
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file reports 
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 including any subsidiary or 
affiliate whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements 
of such company” from retaliating against an employee. Id. § 1514A(a).  
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employee.30 Relief for the injured whistleblower includes 
reinstatement to the same seniority status that the employee 
would have had but for the discrimination, double the amount of 
back pay plus interest, and compensation for any special damages 
sustained, which also includes reasonable attorneys’ fees.31 
In addition to its antiretaliation provision, the FCA 
offers a monetary reward to whistleblowers.32 The 
whistleblower, however, must initiate the action himself.33 If 
the government (through the Department of Justice) elects to 
proceed with the complaint, the whistleblower is entitled to 15 
to 25 percent of the action’s proceeds or settlement.34 The 
ultimate amount of the reward depends on the extent to which 
the whistleblower “substantially contributed to the prosecution 
of the action.”35 If the government declines to pursue an action 
initiated by the whistleblower, then the whistleblower will 
have the right to conduct it himself36 and be eligible for a 
reward the court deems reasonable (between 25 and 30 percent 
of the proceeds of the action).37 In making this determination, 
the court must consider the whistleblower’s role in advancing 
the case to litigation, as well as the significance of the 
information he furnishes.38 Under the FCA, the whistleblower 
  
 30 An employee, contractor, or agent is entitled to “all relief to make [him] 
whole[,]” if he “is discharged, demoted, suspended . . . or in any other manner discriminated 
against in the terms and conditions of employment . . . because of [his] lawful acts . . . in 
furtherance of an action under this section . . . .” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. § 3730(d). 
 33 Id. § 3730(b)(1). 
 34 Id. § 3730(d)(1). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Within 60 days after the whistleblower files his report, the Government 
will either proceed with the action, in which case the action is to be conducted by the 
Government, or notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case 
the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action. Id. 
§ 3730(b)(4). 
 37 Id. § 3730(d)(2). Some courts have interpreted the False Claims Act’s 
whistleblower bounty provision to provide the minimum amount of recovery for 
individuals who “substantially and independently contribute to the government’s 
recovery.” See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burr v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 882 F. Supp. 
166, 168 (M.D. Fla. 1995). If, however, a whistleblower suffers “considerable personal 
and professional expense,” he is entitled to recover the full thirty percent. Id. The 
courts have further held that the “maximum recovery is reserved for situations where 
the [whistleblower] actively and uniquely aids the government in the prosecution of the 
case.” Id. Other courts believe that an “important factor in determining whether a 
[whistleblower] has actively and uniquely aided the government is if the matter 
proceeds all the way through trial.” United States ex rel. Fox v. Nw. Nephrology 
Assocs., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1112 (E.D. Wash. 2000). Such courts have held that “[i]t 
should be a rare occurrence that the maximum percentage is awarded in a case that 
has settled short of trial.” Id.  
 38 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
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may also be rewarded up to 10 percent of the action’s proceeds 
even if the court determines that the action was based 
primarily on information that has already been made public.39  
C. Internal Revenue Code’s Whistleblower Provision 
The Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower provision 
also provides bounties to whistleblowers reporting tax 
violations. The provision states that a whistleblower who 
furnishes information regarding an employer’s underpayment 
of taxes or violations of tax laws40 may receive an award of 15 to 
30 percent of the collected proceeds.41 The amount of the 
whistleblower’s reward will be determined in light of the extent 
to which he “substantially contributed to such action.”42 If the 
information provided by the whistleblower is based principally 
on public information,43 the whistleblower may receive an 
award of up to 10 percent of the collected proceeds or 
settlement.44 This determination must take into account the 
significance of the whistleblower’s role in contributing to the 
action.45 In this respect, the Internal Revenue Code’s 
whistleblower incentive system is similar to that of the False 
Claims Act.46 The Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower 
provisions, however, are limited in scope and do not apply to 
illegal actions by individual taxpayers whose gross annual 
income is not more than $200,000 or where the amounts in 
dispute do not exceed $2 million.47 In addition, unlike under the 
  
 39 Id.  
 40 If the Secretary of the Treasury proceeds with an administrative or judicial 
action for the underpayment of taxes or a violation of the internal revenue laws based 
on information brought by a whistleblower, the whistleblower is entitled to receive a 
monetary reward. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006). 
 41 The whistleblower shall “receive as an award at least 15 percent but not 
more than 30 percent of the collected proceeds . . . resulting from the action (including 
any related actions) or from any settlement in response to such action.” Id.  
 42 Id. There are several factors considered when determining the amount of 
the whistleblower’s reward. For instance, the award is reduced where the 
whistleblower planned the actions leading to the underpayment of tax. Id. § 7623(b)(3). 
 43 Id. § 7623(b)(2)(A). 
 44 Id. 
 45 The Whistleblower Office is to take into account the “significance of the 
individual’s information and the role of such individual and any legal representative of 
such individual in contributing to such action.” Id. 
 46 Under the False Claims Act, the degree to which the whistleblower 
contributed to the prosecution of the action is a factor that determines the amount of 
the reward. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006). 
 47 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(5). 
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False Claims Act, the payment of the whistleblower reward 
here is discretionary, not mandatory.48 
D. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 
of 1988 
The Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 
1988 (Insider Trading Act) added a whistleblower bounty 
provision to the Securities Exchange Act of 193449 that applies 
only to insider trading.50 The Insider Trading Act prohibits any 
person from purchasing or selling a security while in 
possession of material and nonpublic information51 and 
mandates an award to whistleblowers of up to 10 percent of the 
proceeds of an action brought for any such violation they 
helped expose.52  
These preexisting whistleblower statutes protect 
whistleblowers from employer retaliation, and even provide 
monetary rewards to incent whistleblowing. These provisions, 
however, protect and reward whistleblowers only in limited 
circumstances. For instance, SOX’s whistleblower protection 
provision applies only to publicly traded companies,53 and the 
  
 48 Courts have held that the whistleblower reward provision in 26 U.S.C 
§ 7623(b)(1) is not “money-mandating.” Wilson v. United States, No. 07-191T, 2007 U.S. 
Claims LEXIS 268, at *5-6 (Fed. Cl. July 13, 2007). Instead, the provision gives the 
Internal Revenue Service the “broad discretion to decide whether to make an award or 
how much to grant.” Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also 
Schmidt v. IRS, No. 08-10037, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39376, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 
2008) (concluding that an award under the Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower 
provision is discretionary unless there have been negotiations with the whistleblower, 
and the whistleblower entered into an explicit agreement on the amount of the award 
with the Internal Revenue Service); Conner v. United States, No. 06-655C, 2007 U.S. 
Claims LEXIS 104, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 28, 2007) (holding that the statute only gives the 
Internal Revenue Status “broad discretion” to determine whether to make an award); 
Destefano v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 291, 293 (2002) (stating that the Internal Revenue 
Code’s whistleblower reward provision is a “discretionary statute” that does “not mandate 
monetary rewards and consequently do[es] not create a substantive right to money 
damages”); Krug v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 96, 97 (1998) (ruling that the Internal 
Revenue Service is not obligated to reward informants).  
 49 Insider Trading Act and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677.  
 50 Id. § 21A, 102 Stat. at 4677-78.  
 51 Id. 
 52 “[T]here shall be paid from amounts imposed as a penalty . . . such sums, 
not to exceed 10 percent of such amounts, as the [SEC] deems appropriate, to the 
person or persons who provide information leading to the imposition of such penalty.” 
Id. § 21A(e), 102 Stat. at 4679.  
 53 The provision prohibits any company with a class of securities “registered 
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file 
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” from retaliating 
against an employee. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006). 
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Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower bounty program applies 
to an individual only if the disputed amount exceeds $2 
million.54 Further, such rewards are not mandatory.55 Although 
bounties under the False Claims Act are mandated, the 
whistleblower himself must initiate the action,56 thereby saving 
the government from administrative expenses. The Dodd-
Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions, however, largely 
eliminate these limitations and drastically expand the 
applicability of whistleblower laws.  
II. WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND PROTECTION UNDER 
THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
The Dodd-Frank Act greatly expands preexisting 
whistleblower bounty and antiretaliation provisions. It amends 
the SEC’s whistleblower provision by expanding its scope to 
cases other than those involving insider trading.57 The newly 
amended whistleblower provision now applies to any violation of 
securities laws and prohibits employers from discharging, 
demoting, suspending, threatening, or otherwise discriminating 
against a whistleblower.58 The provision also expands the 
definition of a whistleblower, which is now defined as an 
individual, or two or more individuals acting jointly, who provide 
information “relating to a violation of the securities laws.”59 
The Dodd-Frank Act also incentivizes whistleblowing by 
mandating a monetary reward to informants who provide 
“original information” regarding illegal activity.60 The provision 
  
 54 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(5)(B) (2006). 
 55 See supra note 48.  
 56 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006). 
 57 See 15. U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2001 & Supp. 2011).  
 58 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). The provision reads: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or 
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in 
the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by 
the whistleblower (i) in providing information to the [SEC] in accordance 
with this section; (ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any 
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the [SEC] based upon or 
related to such information; or (iii) in making disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), including section 
10A(m) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 78f(m)), section 1513(e) of title 18, United 
States Code, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction 
of the [SEC]. 
Id. 
 59 Id. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
 60 Id. § 78u-6(b)(1).  
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defines “original information” as information that is derived 
from the  
independent knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower; is not known 
to the Commission from any other source, unless the whistleblower 
is the original source of the information; and is not exclusively 
derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative 
hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit or investigation, or 
from the news media, unless the whistleblower is a source of the 
information.61 
Further, the Act expands the type of person that can be a 
whistleblower. For instance, a whistleblower is not required to 
be an employee to receive the reward.62 In order to be eligible 
for a reward, however, the information furnished by the 
whistleblower must result in sanctions exceeding $1 million.63 
Thus, if the whistleblower qualifies for the reward, he is 
guaranteed to receive a payment of at least 10 percent of $1 
million, or $100,000. Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act inserts 
a nearly identical whistleblower bounty provision into the 
Commodity Exchange Act.64  
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act also expands the 
types of companies these provisions apply to by amending 
SOX’s whistleblower provision.65 Unamended, SOX’s 
antiretaliation statute applied only to publicly traded 
companies.66 Under the Dodd-Frank Act amendments, however, 
now any “subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is 
included in the consolidated financial statements of such 
company”67 is within the purview of SOX’s whistleblower 
protection provision.  
Although the Dodd-Frank Act makes significant 
changes in preexisting whistleblower statutes, section 1057 of 
the Act most notably creates a broad private right of action for 
employees in the financial services industry who are retaliated 
  
 61 Id. § 78u-6(a)(3).  
 62 A “whistleblower” is defined as “any individual who provides . . . information 
relating to a violation of securities laws to the [SEC].” Id. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).  
 63 Under section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a whistleblower 
is to be rewarded only in a “covered judicial or administrative action.” Id. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
A “covered judicial or administrative action,” in turn, is defined as one that results in 
monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 748(a)(1), 922(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841, 1842 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011)). 
 64 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
 65 Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.  
 66 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006). 
 67 Dodd-Frank Act § 929A, 124 Stat. at 1852.  
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against for disclosing information regarding a violation of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, or any other provision that is subject to the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau).68  
Under section 1057, “covered employees”69 are protected 
from retaliation if they engage in certain protected activities.70 
A covered employee is any individual who performs “tasks 
related to the offering or provision of a consumer financial 
product or service,”71 or an authorized representative of such an 
individual.72 An employer (or any affiliate of such employer if 
the affiliate is a service provider) engaged in the offering or 
provision of a “consumer financial product or service” cannot 
discriminate against the whistleblower-employee, or cause the 
whistleblower-employee to be discriminated against.73 The 
complainant has the burden of making a prima facie showing 
that his disclosure of information was a contributing factor to 
the alleged retaliatory action.74 But if the employer 
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that he would 
have taken the same unfavorable personnel action even in the 
absence of that behavior, then the complainant is not entitled 
to any relief.75 If it is ultimately determined that the 
whistleblower was the victim of discrimination in violation of 
section 1057, he is entitled to reinstatement to his former 
position, as well as compensatory damages.76 
  
 68 Id. § 1057, 124 Stat. at 2031. Section 1011 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
establishes an independent executive agency called the “Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection.” The Bureau is to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial 
products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.” Id. § 1011(a), 124 
Stat. at 1964.  
 69 The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits an employer’s retaliatory action against 
“any covered employee or any authorized representative of covered employees.” Id. 
§ 1057(a), 124 Stat. at 2031.  
 70 A whistleblower’s protected activity includes providing information to the 
employer or any government authority relating to any violation of any law that is 
subject to the Bureau’s jurisdiction, as well as “testify[ing] . . . in any proceeding 
resulting from the . . . enforcement of any . . . law that is subject to the [Bureau’s 
jurisdiction] . . . or object[ing] to . . . any activity . . . that the employee . . . reasonably 
believed to be a violation of any law . . . subject to the [Bureau’s jurisdiction].” Id. 
§ 1057(a)(1)-(4), 124 Stat. at 2031-32. 
 71 Id. § 1057(b), 124 Stat. at 2032. 
 72 The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits a covered person or service provider from 
discriminating against “any covered employee or any authorized representative of 
covered employees” for reporting a violation. Id. § 1057(a), 124 Stat. at 2031. 
 73 Id. §§ 1002(6), 1057(a), 124 Stat. at 1961, 2031. 
 74 Id. § 1057(c)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 2033. 
 75 Id. § 1057(c)(3)(C), 124 Stat. at 2033. Note that these standards of proof 
are essentially identical to those governing whistleblower retaliation claims brought 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See supra Part I.A. 
 76 Dodd-Frank Act § 1057(c)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 2033. 
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Section 1057 of the Dodd-Frank Act as well as the Act’s 
amendments to preexisting whistleblower laws dramatically 
expands the scope of liability under antiretaliation provisions. 
The SEC’s whistleblower program now extends to cases other 
than insider trading, and whistleblowers engaged in the 
consumer financial product or service industries are offered 
expansive protection from retaliation or discrimination.77 The 
Dodd-Frank Act also creates generous bounty programs offering 
large monetary rewards to qualifying whistleblowers in efforts to 
encourage individuals to report violations.78 However, the 
effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions is 
doubtful, and likely overincentivizes whistleblowing. 
III. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S 
WHISTLEBLOWER BOUNTY PROGRAM 
Despite legislators’ good intentions, the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s bounty program overincentivizes whistleblowing and will 
waste administrative resources because it provides what 
studies show are unnecessarily excessive awards. Although the 
bounty program was enacted to encourage whistleblowing, the 
monetary rewards are likely unnecessary in advancing the 
provision’s purported goals. Further, the bounty provisions lack 
significant threshold considerations and fail to discourage the 
submission of frivolous claims. As a result, whistleblowers are 
overincentivized.  
A. Goals of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Bounty 
Program 
The legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act reveals 
Congress’s intent “to motivate those with inside knowledge to 
come forward and assist the Government to identify and 
prosecute persons who have violated securities laws and 
recover money for victims of financial fraud.”79 Congress 
emphasized the importance of bounty programs because 
whistleblowers “often face the difficult choice between telling 
the truth and the risk of committing ‘career suicide.’”80 Harry 
  
 77 See infra Part IV. 
 78 The program “[r]ecogniz[es] that whistleblowers often face the difficult 
choice between telling the truth and the risk of committing ‘career suicide.’” S. REP. NO. 
111-176, at 110 (2010).  
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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Markopolos, Certified Fraud Examiner and Madoff 
whistleblower, attested to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
whistleblower bounty programs. He cited statistics holding that 
whistleblower tips uncovered 54 percent of fraud schemes in 
public companies, as opposed to the 4 percent that external 
auditors—including the SEC—exposed.81 SEC Chairman Mary 
L. Schapiro further noted that “[w]histleblowers can be a source 
of valuable firsthand information that may otherwise not come 
to light”82 and that “[t]hese high-quality leads can be crucial to 
protecting investors and recovering ill-gotten gains from 
wrongdoers.”83 Congress has made it abundantly clear that one 
of the primary purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower 
bounty program is to encourage the reporting of “high-quality” 
tips,84 and the $1 million requirement that whistleblowers must 
meet in order to qualify for a reward evidences legislators’ 
efforts to encourage the disclosure of major violations. Although 
it may seem logical that providing monetary rewards 
incentivizes whistleblowers to report illegal activity, studies 
show that this assumption is not entirely true. In fact, in light of 
recent research, the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower bounty 
program is counterproductive.  
B. Research Indicating the Ineffectiveness of the Dodd-
Frank Act’s Whistleblower Bounty Program 
A recent study demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s bounty program. The study examined the role 
incentives play in whistleblowers’ decisions to report illegal 
activity.85 It concluded that in cases where the whistleblower has 
a “greater ethical stake in the outcome” monetary incentives 
might be unnecessary and counterproductive because they may 
offset the whistleblower’s internal ethical motivation.86 
Conversely, when the perceived severity of the misconduct is 
  
 81  See Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Harry Markopolos). 
 82 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes New Whistleblower 
Program Under Dodd-Frank Act (Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2010/2010-213.htm.  
 83 Id.  
 84 Holzer & Johnson, supra note 18. 
 85 See generally Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The 
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting 
Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151 (2010). 
 86 Id. at 1207. 
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low, “external incentives,” such as monetary rewards, “matter 
much more” to the whistleblower’s decision to report the 
illegality.87 In other words, in cases where the activity at issue 
has significant ethical and moral implications, research 
suggests that the whistleblower does not need monetary 
incentives to compel him to report the violation. On the other 
hand, situations involving less severe conduct may require 
financial rewards to encourage the whistleblower to report the 
misconduct. These results are “contrary to the basic intuition of 
the legal policy maker to give higher rewards as the 
misconduct is more severe.”88 Given its legislative intent to 
encourage the reporting of major violations, the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s whistleblower bounty program is likely to be 
counterproductive, as it offers large monetary rewards, which 
studies indicate are unnecessary for cases involving significant 
moral implications.89 Other studies show that “extrinsic 
motivators do not alter the attitudes that underlie our 
behaviors. They do not create an enduring commitment to any 
value or action.”90 Thus, it is unlikely that the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
whistleblower bounty program will be successful in furthering 
legislators’ goals. The Dodd-Frank Act also lacks significant 
thresholds that the whistleblower must overcome, which is 
likely to result in a surge of reports of trivial claims.  
1. The Ineffectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Large 
Monetary Rewards 
The general perception regarding the relationship 
between the amount of sanctions imposed and the severity of 
misconduct is that the greater the amount of sanctions, the 
more severe the misconduct.91 Thus, through the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s imposition of the $1 million minimum, the legislature 
appears to intend to reward whistleblowers only in cases where 
the severity of misconduct and moral offensiveness is high. The 
study generally found that “[i]n areas where the misconduct is 
expected to trigger high internal motivation, there is less need 
  
 87 Id. at 1194. 
 88 Id. at 1204. 
 89 See id. 
 90 Alfie Kohn, Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 
1993, at 55. 
 91 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 85, at 1204 (stating that “legal policy 
maker[s] give higher rewards as the misconduct is more severe (given its likely 
correlation with greater harm to society)”). 
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to invest in incentive mechanisms.”92 The Dodd-Frank Act’s 
bounty program appears to contradict this research, as it 
guarantees a qualifying whistleblower a minimum reward of 
$100,000 for a tip regarding a violation worthy of sanctions of 
at least $1 million.93 Consequently, the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
bounty program is excessive, as it offers monetary incentives 
that studies show are not necessary.  
The large rewards offered to whistleblowers 
overincentivize whistleblowing, and may ultimately prove to be 
a waste of limited agency resources. This is not to suggest that 
all whistleblower bounty programs should be eliminated. Due 
to its inherent risks,94 whistleblowing, to some extent, should be 
incentivized through regulatory policies that “encourage 
individuals to break the code of silence in corrupt 
organizations.”95 Eliminating all whistleblower bounty 
provisions and instead implementing a legal duty to report, 
along with a fine for a failure to report, is unlikely to be 
effective in encouraging whistleblowing, as there is a “growing 
body of studies both in social psychology and in behavioral 
economics indicating that people respond more strongly to 
incentives than penalties.”96 However, monetary incentives may 
not be necessary or effective in all situations, and thus it is 
imperative that legislators accurately assess and determine the 
optimal level of rewards to ensure the effective application of 
limited agency resources.97 Although the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
whistleblower bounty program attempts to achieve this ideal 
level of whistleblower incentives, it fails to do so. By 
mandating large rewards to whistleblowers, the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s whistleblower provision invites a flood of whistleblower 
reports, which may not necessarily be of the “high-quality” 
  
 92 Id.  
 93 Under section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act, a whistleblower is to 
receive a minimum of ten percent of the sanctions recovered, which must be at least 
$1,000,000, resulting in a minimum recovery of $100,000. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)-(b)(1) 
(West 2009 & Supp. 2011). The law further provides that a “covered judicial or 
administrative action” is an action that “results in monetary sanctions exceeding 
$1,000,000.” Id. § 78u-6(a)(1).  
 94 See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 85, at 1157-58 (“The decision of whether 
to blow the whistle is a complex one and inevitably involves certain risks. . . . In 
addition to direct employment retaliation, reporting often entails psychological and 
societal costs, including fear, guilt and mistreatment by peers and community. . . . One 
commentator has described whistle-blowing as ‘professional suicide.’” (quoting James 
Gobert & Maurice Punch, Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998, 63 MOD. L. REV. 25, 35 (2000))). 
 95 Id. at 1159. 
 96 Id. at 1181.  
 97 See id. at 1182. 
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legislators intended to encourage.98 Although some 
whistleblowers may be discouraged from bringing such claims 
forward because of fear of retaliation, in light of the expansive 
protection granted by the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower 
protection provisions, this ultimately may not prove to be a 
significant disincentive.99 
2. The Dodd-Frank Act’s Lack of Significant Threshold 
Considerations 
The excessive rewards provided by the Dodd-Frank Act 
could be justifiable if there were meaningful thresholds the 
whistleblower had to overcome in order to receive his reward. 
Threshold considerations involve what the whistleblower must 
first do and what the result of the disclosures must be in order to 
qualify for a reward.100 For example, the FCA contains significant 
threshold considerations101—namely, the whistleblower must 
initiate the litigation himself.102 As a result of this prerequisite, 
whistleblowers may be discouraged from reporting frivolous 
claims.103 Such meaningful threshold considerations are absent 
in the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower bounty provisions.  
For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act does not contain 
significant threshold considerations with respect to who can 
benefit from its provisions. In fact, the whistleblower does not 
even need to be an employee of the entity allegedly engaging in 
the illegal activity.104 Although the whistleblower must provide 
information that is not known to the agency from another 
  
 98 Holzer & Johnson, supra note 18.  
 99 See discussion supra Part II; see also Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. 
Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty 
Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1173-74 (“Although an informant’s discounted 
losses can arise in many ways, the ‘big ticket’ potential harms are harm to her 
livelihood . . . . In this vein, discounted retaliation costs arise from a host of actions a 
defendant could take against the informant . . . .”). However, federal and state 
antiretaliation statutes protect the whistleblower, and “[a]lthough an informant may 
not find his former workplace a pleasant post-informing environment, these statutes 
can ensure that he remains gainfully employed or receives compensation for any harm 
suffered in the workplace, thus mitigating his discounted retaliation losses.” Id. at 
1174. Such discounted losses may also include “reputational harms and the mental and 
emotional costs of testifying in litigation.” Id. 
 100 Id. at 1150.  
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 1159.  
 104 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011). 
2011] CORPORATE CORRUPTION 319 
source,105 thus overcoming a threshold requirement concerning 
the type of information covered under the Act, this may not 
ultimately prove to be a difficult standard to overcome as 
whistleblowers can race to furnish the agencies with their 
inside information. Another arguable “threshold” contained in 
the Dodd-Frank Act is the $1 million requirement whistleblowers 
must satisfy in order to be eligible for a reward.106 Although this 
million-dollar minimum does provide some limitation on the 
whistleblower’s eligibility for the bounty, there is no provision 
preventing the whistleblower from reporting frivolous claims in 
hopes that the sanctions exceed $1 million.107 Additionally, 
whistleblowers do not need to demonstrate the veracity of their 
allegations. Under the finalized rules, the whistleblower submits 
his or her information regarding potential securities law 
violations under the penalty of perjury.108 However, “there is little 
to deter individuals from making unjustified accusations of 
wrongdoing,”109 and the possibility that a whistleblower will 
provide a knowingly false statement that could be the basis for 
prosecution of perjury110 is “remote at best.”111 
Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions 
lack significant threshold considerations and fail to discourage 
whistleblowers from reporting trivial claims. The Act also 
offers excessive monetary rewards, and as a result, 
overincentivizes whistleblowing.  
  
 105 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 748(a)(4)(B), 922(a)(3)(B), 124 
Stat. 1376, 1740, 1842 (2010) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 
2000 & Supp. 2011)). 
 106 A whistleblower is rewarded only in a “covered judicial or administrative 
action,” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1), which is defined as an action that results in 
monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 748(a)(1), 922(a)(1), 124 
Stat. at 1841, 1842. 
 107 Bruce Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty 
Provision, SEC. DOCKET (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/ 
09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frank-whistleblower-bounty-provision/ (noting that “[t]he 
millions that whistleblowers might potentially reap could also encourage a lottery 
mentality, where people file complaints on weak or wholly illegitimate claims ‘just in 
case.’”). However, there is a provision that penalizes the whistleblower for willfully 
furnishing false information. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 748(m), 922(i), 124 Stat. at 1746, 1847.  
 108 Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 
34,300 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Final Rules]; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(i).  
 109 Letter from Jones Day, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Jones Day Letter].  
 110 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006), any person who “knowingly and willfully 
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up . . . a material fact; (2) makes any 
materially . . . fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false 
writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially . . . fraudulent 
statement . . . will be fined and imprisoned for not more than 5 years.” Id.  
 111 Jones Day Letter, supra note 109.  
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C. Future Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
Whistleblower Bounty Program 
The excessive rewards provided by the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
whistleblower bounty program, as well as its lack of significant 
threshold considerations, is likely to have several implications, 
including an increase in the number of whistleblower claims, a 
burden on administrative costs, and employees’ circumvention of 
companies’ internal compliance systems.  
1. Substantial Increase in the Number of Whistleblower 
Claims  
Expected bounty payments are one of the most 
important factors that influence whistleblowers’ decisions to 
disclose a violation.112 In fact, “[m]uch of the [whistleblower’s] 
uncertainty [is attributed to] the agency’s discretion to award a 
reduced bounty or no bounty at all.”113 Under the Dodd-Frank 
Act, a whistleblower’s uncertainty regarding payment is largely 
eliminated. Provided that his information results in sanctions 
exceeding $1 million, the whistleblower is certain that he will 
receive a reward of at least $100,000. But if monetary rewards 
are high, “every potential informant with a crumb of 
information might crawl out of the woodwork hoping to hit the 
bounty jackpot.”114 In fact, claims began “trickling in” shortly 
after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.115 Although “no 
flood of tips” has occurred yet since the SEC finalized the 
whistleblower provisions,116 Sean McKessy, head of the 
Whistleblower Office, is expanding his staff117 and the SEC 
predicts it will receive approximately thirty-thousand tips per 
year.118 Further, it is likely that a SEC announcement of a large 
  
 112 Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1152.  
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Jean Eaglesham & Ashby Jones, Whistleblower Bounties Pose Challenges, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704058704 
576015210866784294.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection. 
 116 Andrea Shalal-Esa, US SEC Says Will Fix Whistleblower Rule if Any 
Problems, REUTERS (Aug. 11, 2011, 6:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
08/11/sec-whistleblowers-idUSN1E77A1YH20110811. 
 117 See id. 
 118 Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 115. 
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reward arising from a Dodd-Frank whistleblower initiative will 
trigger an increased number of claims.119  
Due to the Act’s lack of significant threshold 
considerations,120 whistleblowers may rush to report alleged 
violations without confirming that the allegations are valid in 
order to ensure that they are the original source of information. 
Ultimately, the unnecessary payments the whistleblower 
receives is likely to be ineffective in furthering the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s goal of soliciting “high quality” tips. Instead, the Dodd-
Frank Act’s whistleblower bounty program overincentivizes 
whistleblowing, and is likely to lead to a surge of reports and a 
burden on administrative costs.  
2. Burden on Administrative Costs 
Whistleblower bounty programs may ostensibly lower 
the cost of obtaining vital information, but the Dodd-Frank Act 
will not ultimately save administrative resources.121 A reduction 
in administrative costs may result if the statute contained 
meaningful threshold considerations, such as in the False 
Claims Act, which permits private individuals to bring the suit 
on behalf of the government.122 However, the administration 
under the Dodd-Frank Act will have to “review—and 
occasionally litigate—a substantial number of claims that turn 
out to be grounded on poor information or information the 
[agency] or the public already possessed.”123 Unlike the False 
Claims Act, where the government does not conduct most of the 
litigation,124 the administration under the Dodd-Frank Act will 
have to devote further resources to investigate the alleged 
misconduct. Additionally, given the likelihood that the Dodd-
Frank Act will result in a drastically increased amount of 
whistleblower reports, agencies will expend additional “time 
and resources when sorting good tips from the bad.”125 The 
  
 119 Doug Clark, Opening the Floodgates: The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions’ 
Impact on Corporate America, BOARDMEMBER.COM, http://www.boardmember.com/Article_ 
Details.aspx?id=5642&page=1 (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
 120 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 121 Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1158-59.  
 122 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006).  
 123 Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1159.  
 124 Id. “Of the first four hundred [False Claims Act] cases filed, the 
Department of Justice . . . joined as a litigant in only seventy; the others proceeded 
privately.” Id.  
 125 Id. at 1171. Aside from its practical consequences, implementing 
whistleblower incentive programs also has several ethical implications, and the 
morality of the practice of rewarding informants has been disputed. Id. at 1191. The 
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administrative cost of processing these voluminous reports may 
exceed the benefit gained from enticing a few whistleblowers 
holding excellent information on high-level crimes.126 The rules 
provide that whistleblowers who wish to participate in the 
whistleblower program must “declare, under penalty of perjury, 
that their submission is truthful to the best of their knowledge.”127 
Thus, the SEC argues, the whistleblower rules sufficiently 
discourage frivolous claims.128 It reasons that “[t]his should reduce 
the costs incurred by the [SEC] from devoting resources to review 
and evaluate frivolous submissions, and also create efficiency 
gains by permitting the [SEC] to place greater reliance on the 
accuracy of information that is received.”129 But the rules lack 
threshold considerations that prevent whistleblowers from 
reporting claims in hopes that they will result in sanctions 
exceeding $1 million.130 As a result, while their submissions may 
not be perjurious, they may not be of the high qualify sought by 
legislators when drafting the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Although the Internal Revenue Code’s whistleblower 
bounty program was profitable before its 2006 amendment,131 it 
is important to note that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
did not pay whistleblowers the maximum reward of 15 
percent.132 In fact, in 1993, the IRS paid an average reward of 3 
percent of resulting sanctions.133 Data further indicate that the 
IRS “not only pa[id] small percentages and small rewards but 
also pa[id] them to a small number of claimants.”134 Thus, it is 
  
general opinion is that informants should voluntarily come forward with information, 
rather than being “brib[ed]” to disclose any illegal activity. Id. at 1192. One U.S. 
District Court Judge noted, “I don’t think that turkeys like that ought to receive a dime 
of my money.” Id. at 1191 (quoting Judge Alcee Hastings). Others, however, do not find 
such whistleblower incentives as immoral. Id. at 1192. Some view such programs as 
“right and honorable,” and hold the viewpoint that whistleblowers are protecting the 
public. Id. Although such moral issues present an interesting debate, it is beyond the 
scope of this note.  
 126 Id. at 1152.  
 127 SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 219. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See infra Part V.A. 
 131 In 1967, the IRS paid $723,995 to whistleblowers whose tips led to a $10 
million collection of tax revenue. In 1977, it recovered $14,602,341 in unpaid tax 
revenue and paid $360,304 in whistleblower rewards. In 1993, the Treasury recovered 
$173 million and whistleblower rewards totaled over $5 million. Ferziger & Currell, 
supra note 99, at 1166-67.  
 132 Id. at 1167. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 1168. Although data indicates that the unamended version of the 
SEC’s whistleblower program also turns an annual profit, id. at 1167, Ferziger and 
Currell note that “statistics on the SEC’s bounty provisions are largely meaningless 
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not unreasonable to posit that the Internal Revenue Code’s 
previous profits are attributable, at least in part, to its small 
and infrequent payouts. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, however, 
agencies must reward qualifying whistleblowers at least 10 
percent of the resulting sanctions.135 As a result, it is 
questionable whether Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program 
will turn a similar profit.136 
Interestingly, the IRS paid its first whistleblower reward 
in 2011, four years after the enactment of its whistleblower 
bounty program.137 Further, the IRS recently reported that it 
would delay payments under its pre-amendment program for up 
to two years.138 According to the Treasury Department’s 
Inspector General for Tax Administration, the IRS’s 
whistleblower program suffered from defects in the “control and 
timely resolution of whistleblower claims.”139 In light of the 
shortcomings of preexisting whistleblower bounty programs, it is 
likely that the Dodd-Frank Act’s bounty program will also be 
ineffective in furthering the Act’s purported goals. 
3. Eradication of Companies’ Internal Compliance 
Systems 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower program is also 
likely to undermine companies’ established internal compliance 
systems. Rather than reporting alleged illegal activity to the 
company itself, potential whistleblowers may opt to forgo 
internal compliance methods and report the misconduct 
directly to the SEC. The National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD) recently argued to the SEC that the Dodd-
Frank Act’s whistleblower provision “encourage[s] employees to 
bypass their own [company’s] compliance departments in their 
  
given the extremely low number of claims and payouts in the ten-year history of SEC 
bounties.” Id. at 1170.  
 135 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011). 
 136 In fact, the SEC has delayed the opening of its whistleblower office due to 
budgeting concerns. Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 115. 
 137 Ashby Jones, After Four Years, the IRS (Finally!) Makes a Whistleblower 
Payment, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Apr. 8, 2011, 11:44 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
law/2011/04/08/after-four-years-the-irs-finally-makes-a-whistleblower-payment. As of 
December 15, 2010, the IRS had not paid any whistleblower rewards. Ryan J. 
Donmoyer, IRS Paid No Rewards in U.S. Whistleblower Program, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
15, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-15/irs-paid-no-rewards-to-
informants-in-u-s-whistleblower-program.html.  
 138 Donmoyer, supra note 137. 
 139 Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 115.  
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eagerness to inform the SEC of suspected foul play.”140 It is 
inappropriate for such SEC investigations to be conducted at 
taxpayer expense,141 and instead, the company should be 
afforded an opportunity to remedy the alleged violation. 
Bypassing internal compliance essentially denies management 
the opportunity to take remedial action because of the 
whistleblower’s pursuit of a profit. As a result, the Dodd-Frank 
Act vitiates companies’ responsible efforts to create and 
implement effective compliance systems and reporting 
schemes.142 
In an attempt to mitigate the subversion of internal 
compliance programs, the SEC now offers a potentially larger 
reward if a whistleblower first utilizes the company’s 
compliance program before reporting the alleged violation to 
the SEC.143 The SEC does this in several ways. For instance, if a 
whistleblower first reports the alleged misconduct to the 
company’s internal compliance program and the company later 
investigates and reports the results of its investigation to the 
SEC, all the information provided to the SEC by the company 
will be attributed to the whistleblower,144 which can lead to an 
increased reward. Additionally, the rules expressly state that a 
whistleblower’s participation in his or her company’s internal 
compliance program is a factor that can increase his or her 
reward.145 Thus, this arguably remedies the issue of the 
eradication of companies’ internal compliance programs.146 
  
 140 Crossman, supra note 17. The NACD also argued that the whistleblower 
program “‘provide[s] an incentive for persons having “independent knowledge” of possible 
corporate wrongdoing to report directly to the SEC,’” and that “‘the legislators who 
enacted the original provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 did not weigh the consequences the provisions could have on the 
ethical and compliance-based cultures of corporations.’” Id. (quoting the NACD).  
 141 Id. 
 142 Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 115 (quoting Susan Hackett, Senior Vice 
President of the Association of Corporate Counsel, who stated that “[t]he proposals cut to 
the very core of what it is that every responsible U.S. company has been trying to do for the 
last couple of decades, which is to create effective, robust compliance reporting systems”).  
 143 Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP 3 (May 26, 2011), 
available at http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/af83e39a-f0df-442e-8e78-1f05c1bc4a54/ 
Presentation/NewsAttachment/b281f060-f24c-42b6-8248-23990d2aca9a/CGSH%20Alert 
%20-%20SEC%20Approves%20New%20Whistleblower%20Program.pdf (“Despite controversy 
and numerous comments from the business community, the final rules do not require 
whistleblowers to avail themselves of internal compliance programs before reporting to the 
SEC. Instead, the [SEC] made several changes to its proposal to add incentives for 
whistleblowers to use internal compliance programs before or when going to the [SEC].”).  
 144 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c) (2010).  
 145 Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(4). 
 146 The SEC states that although it did not require whistleblowers to report 
violations internally, it has “made additional changes to the rules to further incentivize 
 
2011] CORPORATE CORRUPTION 325 
However, it is unclear whether increased monetary rewards will 
be effective in encouraging whistleblowers to first report alleged 
violations internally. First, as noted above,147 studies indicate 
that large monetary rewards offset internal motivations, and 
may prove to be unnecessary and counterproductive.148 Further, 
in light of the court’s interpretation in Egan v. Tradingscreen, 
Inc.,149 whistleblowers are likely to bypass the internal 
compliance system despite the increased reward.  
Egan is the first reported decision under the Dodd-
Frank Act’s whistleblower protection provision,150 and concerns 
a “major issue addressed as part of the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower rulemaking proceedings: the integrity of 
corporate internal compliance and reporting programs.”151 In 
Egan, the whistleblower-employee reported suspected 
fraudulent activity to the company’s internal compliance 
system.152 Despite assurances that he would not be fired, he was 
later terminated and thus filed suit, alleging a violation of the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s antiretaliation provision.153 The employer 
argued that the antiretaliation provisions did not apply 
because the whistleblower-employee did not directly report the 
alleged violation to the SEC.154 The court interpreted the 
whistleblower protection provisions as follows:  
Plaintiff must either allege that his information was reported to the 
[SEC], or that his disclosures fell under the four categories of 
disclosure delineated by 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) that do not 
require such reporting: those under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
Securities Exchange Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), or other laws and 
regulations subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].155 
The Egan Court reasoned that the legislature could 
have easily provided broader protection for whistleblowers 
  
whistleblowers to utilize their companies’ internal compliance and reporting systems 
when appropriate.” SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 5. 
 147 See supra Part III.B.  
 148 See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 85, at 1154-55. 
 149 No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 4, 2011). 
 150 Letter from Stephen M. Kohn, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Whistleblowers Ctr., to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, and David A. Stawick, Sec’y, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, at 1 (May 17, 2011) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter National Whistleblowers Center Letter].  
 151 Id. 
 152 Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47713, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
 153 Id. at *5-6.  
 154 Id. at *9.  
 155 Id. at *13-14. 
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alleging securities laws and thus the “absence of similarly 
broad protections . . . indicates that Congress intended to 
encourage whistleblowers reporting such violations to report to 
the SEC.”156 As such, the court’s interpretation can be read to 
mean that “employees have no choice but to bypass internal 
reporting systems and directly raise concerns regarding 
violations of securities laws with federal regulatory agencies 
and the Justice Department.”157 In light of the court’s 
interpretation, the possibility of an increased monetary reward 
for using internal compliance systems does not outweigh 
whistleblowers’ concern of retaliation, and thus they are likely 
to report directly to the SEC. In fact, some organizations assert 
that they “will do everything in their power to ensure that 
employees bypass such channels . . . . [as i]t would be the 
height of irresponsibility for whistleblower advocates to urge 
employees to use internal reporting programs.”158As a result, 
the important policy objectives identified by the SEC would be 
“seriously undermined.”159 The Egan Court further noted that 
“[o]bviously, a whistleblower must directly report to the SEC to 
receive a bounty award from the SEC.”160 Consequently, the 
requirement that a whistleblower must report the alleged 
violation to the SEC in order to receive the reward, along with 
the confusion about whether whistleblowers must report to the 
SEC in order to receive protection under the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
antiretaliation provisions, is likely to lead to the eradication of 
internal compliance programs. Thus, the SEC’s attempt to 
encourage whistleblowers to first use companies’ internal 
compliance systems by offering larger rewards is ineffective. 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s excessive bounties and lack of 
significant threshold considerations invite a flood of whistleblower 
reports. Supporters may argue that such monetary incentives are 
necessary, as whistleblowers are unwilling to report violations for 
fear of retaliation or discrimination by their employer. But the 
Dodd-Frank Act also offers expansive protection under its 
antiretaliation statute, largely reducing such fears. As a result, 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s unnecessary and excessive bounty program, 
coupled with its expansive antiretaliation protection, 
  
 156 Id. at *12. 
 157 National Whistleblowers Center Letter, supra note 150, at 3. 
 158 Id. at 4. 
 159 Id. at 2.  
 160 Egan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *24. 
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overincentivizes whistleblowing and is likely to lead to the waste 
of administrative resources.  
IV. THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S EXPANSION OF PREEXISTING 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROVISIONS 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s antiretaliation provisions 
drastically expand preexisting laws in two respects: first, by 
expanding the scope of persons prohibited from taking 
retaliatory action, and second, by enlarging the scope of 
persons protected from retaliatory action.  
A. The Expansion of the Class of Persons Prohibited from 
Taking Retaliatory Action 
Unamended, SOX’s whistleblower protection provision 
applies only to certain publicly traded companies.161 In applying 
the statute’s plain meaning, courts have held that a narrow 
reading—applying the provisions only to public companies—is 
“necessary” to limit the scope of SOX’s antiretaliation 
protection.162 Here courts have argued that a contrary holding 
might have the effect of extending the statute “far beyond” 
what Congress envisioned.163 Additionally, courts have held that 
to subject nonpublic subsidiaries of publicly traded parent 
companies to SOX’s whistleblower statute would “widen the 
scope of the whistleblower protection provisions beyond what 
Congress appears to have intended.”164 Congress, however, has 
effectuated such intent through the Dodd-Frank Act. The 
Dodd-Frank Act amended SOX’s antiretaliation provision, 
which now provides that “any subsidiary or affiliate whose 
financial information is included in the consolidated financial 
  
 161 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006); see also Brady v. Calyon Sec. (USA), 406 F. 
Supp. 2d 307, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that an employee of nonpublicly traded 
companies was not covered by SOX and that a “specific requirement . . . is that 
defendant be a publicly traded company”); Flake v. New World Pasta Co., 03-126, Final 
Decision and Order (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 25, 2004) (concluding that pursuant to the 
plain language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, even when an employer is a publicly traded 
company, it is not covered if it is not registered under section 12 or required to file 
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). 
 162 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d. 141, 155 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing 
Goodman v. Decisive Analytics Corp., 2006 SOX 11 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 10, 2006)). 
 163 Id. (quoting Goodman v. Decisive Analytics Corp., 2006 SOX 11 (Dep’t of 
Labor Jan. 10, 2006)). 
 164 Malin v. Siemens Med. Solutions Health Servs., 638 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500-
01 (D. Md. 2008). 
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statements”165 of a publicly traded company is prohibited from 
taking discriminatory or retaliatory action against a 
whistleblower-employee.166 Under this amendment, the scope of 
SOX’s antiretaliation provision has been significantly 
expanded, and now prohibits non-publicly traded subsidiaries 
or affiliates of publicly traded companies from taking 
discriminatory action against whistleblowers. Arguably, the 
scope of persons prohibited from taking retaliatory action 
under SOX is still restricted, as the statute applies only to 
allegations of violations of securities regulations.167 In this 
respect, the scope of SOX’s whistleblower provision may remain 
limited. It is unlikely, however, that this “limitation” will ease 
employers’ concerns, since individuals hoping to blow the 
whistle on violations of regulations other than securities laws 
can claim protection under a new antiretaliation statute 
provided in section 1057 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
implements a very broad antiretaliation provision. 
The amended antiretaliation provision protects 
whistleblowers from retaliation against “any person that 
engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product 
or service,”168 rather than to a narrow band of certain publicly 
traded companies. The provision also broadly defines “financial 
products or services” and includes appraisers, check cashers, and 
lenders.169 Affiliates of financial service providers170 are also subject 
  
 165 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1852 (2010) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011)) (emphasis 
added). 
 166 Id.  
 167 Id. In Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., the whistleblower-employee argued that 
his employer, a privately held company, violated the antiretaliation provision. No. 10 
Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). The 
court, however, stated that “a specific requirement . . . is that defendant be a publicly 
traded company.” Id. at *14 (quoting Brady v. Calyon Sec. (USA), 406 F. Supp. 2d 307, 
317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). The plaintiff attempted to argue that the company was selling 
securities and sought an initial public offering. Id. at *14-15. However, the court found 
that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to identify the securities covered by the Exchange Act which 
he claims [the defendant] sold. A mere allegation of an intention to sell securities, 
without more, is not enough to turn a privately held company into a publicly traded 
one.” Id. at *15.  
 168 12 U.S.C.A. § 5481(6)(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011). 
 169 The term “financial product or service,” in turn, includes extending credit; 
appraising real and personal property, providing credit counseling, check cashing, and 
real estate settlement services; and collecting or analyzing information “used in 
connection with any decision regarding the offering or provision of a consumer financial 
product or service . . . .” Id. § 5481(15)(A). The term “financial product or service” also 
includes acting as a “custodian of funds or any financial instrument for use by or on 
behalf of a consumer . . . providing financial advisory services . . . to consumers on 
individual financial matters . . . [and] providing services to assist a consumer with debt 
management or debt settlement . . . or avoiding foreclosure.” Id. 
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to SOX’s expanded laws, provided that the affiliate acts as a 
“service provider,”171 or someone who furnishes a “material 
service” to the financial service provider in connection with the 
offering of a financial product or service. As a result, under the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s amendment to SOX’s preexisting whistleblower 
provisions, persons who provide or offer financial products or 
services, and even those who may indirectly offer or provide 
financial services, are subject to antiretaliation provisions. 
This expansion of liability under the Dodd-Frank Act is 
startling. Application of the preexisting statutes was limited to 
cases of insider trading, tax evasion, fraudulent transactions with 
the government, and those involving publicly traded companies. 
Under section 1057, however, persons offering or providing 
financial products or services to consumers, and even those who 
provide a “material” service to such providers of financial 
products or services, are subject to antiretaliation provisions. 
The Bureau’s ability to insert additional examples and 
definitions of “financial product or service” further evidences 
the broad scope of the individuals and entities subject to 
section 1057.172 If the Bureau concludes that a financial product 
or service is executed with the purpose of evading any federal 
consumer financial law, or is one that a bank or financial 
holding company is permitted to offer and is likely to have a 
material impact on consumers, the Bureau is explicitly 
authorized to insert that product or service into the Dodd-
Frank Act’s definition of “financial product or service.”173 The 
scope of persons subject to section 1057’s prohibition against 
retaliatory action is noninclusive and can be amended to 
include other persons in the future, further expanding its 
scope. The expanded protection that is now provided to 
whistleblowers leads to increased employer liability, which can 
have numerous negative effects like increased costs.174 
  
 170 Id. An affiliate is a person that “controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with another person” of a person engaged in the offering or provision of 
a consumer financial product or service. Id. § 5481(1), (6)(A).  
 171 Id. § 5481(26). The Dodd-Frank Act explicitly provides that the term 
“service provider” is not to include a person who offers or provides to a covered person a 
support service that is generally provided to businesses or a “similar ministerial 
service,” id. § 5481(26)(B)(i), nor a person who provides “time or space for an 
advertisement for a consumer financial product or service through print, newspaper, or 
electronic media.” Id. § 5481(26)(B)(ii). Note that if the service provider offers or profits 
from its own consumer financial product or service, it is deemed to be a covered person. 
Id. § 5481(26)(C). 
 172 Id. § 5481(15)(A)(xi). 
 173 Id. 
 174 See infra Part IV.C. 
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B. The Expansion of the Class of Persons Protected from 
Retaliatory Action 
The Dodd-Frank Act imprudently expands the class of 
whistleblowers from the previously narrowly defined constraints 
of the preexisting antiretaliation provisions to the current 
definition protecting any whistleblower who performs tasks 
“related” to “the offering or provision of a consumer financial 
product or service.”175 The use of the broad, undefined term 
“related” greatly increases the scope of antiretaliation protection 
beyond what is appropriate to achieve congressional goals.  
In addition, unlike SOX’s antiretaliation provision, 
section 1057 is not limited to whistleblowers alleging certain 
types of violations.176 Instead, legislators set section 1057’s 
parameters broadly, and the statute explicitly applies to 
whistleblowers who allege violations of any law subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Bureau.177 The Bureau’s jurisdiction extends 
to the regulation of the offering and provision of consumer 
financial products or services under the federal consumer 
financial laws, as well as all federal laws concerning public or 
federal contracts, property, works, employees, budgets, or 
funds.178 Protection from retaliation is no longer limited to 
whistleblowers claiming violations of securities laws, tax codes, 
or cases of insider trading. Rather, section 1057 significantly 
expands the class of individuals protected under antiretaliation 
laws.179 Due to the greater protection afforded to them, 
whistleblowers now have additional incentives to blow the 
whistle. The Dodd-Frank Act also increases employers’ liability 
  
 175 12 U.S.C.A. § 5567(b). 
 176 Section 1057 also protects authorized representatives of covered employees. 
Id. § 5567(a). This is similar to SOX’s whistleblower provision, which protects 
“employees” from retaliation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (2006). Accordingly, an “employee” 
includes a “company representative,” which is defined as “any officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a company.” 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2010). 
 177 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1057(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2031 
(2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5567(a)(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011)). 
 178 Id. § 1011(a), 124 Stat. at 1964. 
 179 Sections 748 and 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act amend the Commodity 
Exchange Act and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, respectively. The provisions 
provide that no employer may discriminate or retaliate against an employee because of 
the employee’s furnishing of information to either the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission or the SEC regarding the employer’s misconduct. Id. §§ 748(h)(1)(A), 
922(h)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1744, 1845. These provisions include additional classes of 
individuals who are protected from retaliatory and discriminatory action, further 
expanding the scope of whistleblower protection laws. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h) (West 
2009 & Supp. 2011). 
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to such provisions. This expansion of liability, however, is 
likely to have damaging effects.  
C. The Negative Effects of Employers’ Expanded Liability 
Under Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Protection Statutes 
It is undeniable that antiretaliation laws justly protect 
whistleblowers who report legitimate claims of employers’ 
violations. The positive effects of whistleblower protection laws, 
however, do not justify the Dodd-Frank Act’s dramatic 
expansion of liability under such provisions. Employers’ 
increased liability under the Dodd-Frank Act is likely to lead to 
several damaging consequences. For instance, given the direct 
costs associated with expanded corporate liability, such as 
indemnity and defense costs,180 an increase in liability may 
“affect the economy by influencing the behavior of individual 
corporations.”181 It is likely that such expenses will increase as a 
result of employers’ greater exposure to liability, thereby 
impacting management decisions, including the cost-benefit 
analyses associated with such decisions.182  
Another cost that may result from the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
whistleblower provisions is the “negative effect on 
organizational culture.”183 Management shapes the ethical 
nature of an organization, and by undermining management’s 
internal compliance efforts, the whistleblower provisions are 
“harming the organizational culture.”184 Further, “as 
organizational culture affects organizational performance, 
Dodd-Frank is harming the bottom line.”185 Other costs include 
the damage to organizational reputation and a decrease in 
shareholder wealth caused by SEC actions.186 Additionally, 
employers may implement more stringent employment policies 
in response to their increased liability.187 Although employers 
may refrain from unjustly terminating competent employees as 
  
 180 PETER REUTER, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED CORPORATE 
LIABILITY: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY v (1988) (examining the effects of expanded 
liability in the context of wrongful termination).  
 181 Id. at vi.  
 182 Id. at v.  
 183 David Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Provisions, 6 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 123, 139 (2011).  
 184 Id.  
 185 Id.  
 186 Id. at 139-40.  
 187 REUTER, supra note 180, at vi.  
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a result of the employment policies,188 they may be hesitant to 
terminate incompetent employees for fear of accusations of 
violating antiretaliation laws.189 Consequently, there may be an 
increase in the number of employees retained who in fact should 
be terminated,190 and employers are likely to become “hampered 
in their ability to adjust their employment levels 
expeditiously.”191 Moreover, each new employee represents a 
potential liability in the event of their termination,192 and thus 
employers may incur greater expenditures for recruitment 
efforts.193 The fear of wrongful termination actions can prevent 
managers from “being as flexible in their response to changing 
market conditions, risky investment opportunities, or technology 
advances.”194 In effect, expanded exposure to liability may 
prevent firms from making short-run adjustments in light of 
business fluctuations.195 As a result, companies may increasingly 
rely on overtime contractors or temporary agencies during 
transition periods rather than permanent employees.196 
The expanded protection granted to whistleblowers in 
itself is arguably sufficient to encourage employees to report 
violations, as it eliminates potential whistleblowers’ fears of 
retaliation. But coupled with the excessive bounties offered to 
whistleblowers under the Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers are 
overincentivized, leading to more whistleblower reports197 and 
burdening both employers and administrative agencies.  
V. SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR THE FUTURE 
The ideal whistleblower provision is one that 
“maximize[s] a potential informant’s discounted reward and 
minimize[s] his discounted losses without making the mix so 
attractive as to induce the disclosure of large amounts of bad 
information.”198 The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions, 
  
 188 Id.  
 189 Id.  
 190 Id.  
 191 Id. at 22.  
 192 Id. at vii. 
 193 Id. 
 194 JAMES N. DERTOUZOS, ELAINE HOLLAND & PATRICIA EBENER, THE LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 1 (1988). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 1-2. 
 197 The SEC has already reported a “surge in tips” since the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. See Holzer & Johnson, supra note 18. 
 198 Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1172. A whistleblower’s “discounted 
gain” is the “amount [he] legitimately expects to receive, discounted by the likelihood 
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however, fail to achieve this ideal balance. These provisions 
overincentivize whistleblowing through their exorbitant bounty 
payouts199 and expansive protection against retaliation.200 
Whistleblowers need not overcome significant threshold 
considerations to be eligible for the rewards, and these 
employees are protected by the liberal interpretation of 
antiretaliation provisions. Thus, risk is comparably low for 
whistleblowers, but the potential reward is high. In such 
circumstances, “most informants will come forward with even a 
low level of certainty”201 and inundate government agencies 
with trivial reports. In order to provide a more efficient and 
effective means of policing employers through the use of 
whistleblowers, Congress should ensure that the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s whistleblower provision includes meaningful thresholds 
that the whistleblower must overcome, lower rewards for the 
whistleblower to recover, and appropriate penalties if the 
whistleblower intentionally delays reporting a violation in 
order to increase the amount of his reward. 
A. Implement Significant Threshold Considerations  
In efforts to discourage whistleblowers from reporting 
trivial claims, the Dodd-Frank Act should encourage 
whistleblowers to report only those violations involving a 
substantial amount of money.202 Although the Dodd-Frank Act 
attempts to achieve this by requiring that the whistleblower’s 
information lead to sanctions resulting in at least $1 million,203 
this requirement alone is unlikely to prevent whistleblowers 
from bringing forth insignificant claims. First, the rules now 
provide that, “for the purposes of making an award, [the SEC] 
will aggregate two or more smaller actions that arise from the 
same nucleus of operative facts.”204 This is likely to lead to a 
“just in case” mentality because a whistleblower may think 
  
that the amount will be reduced or not awarded at all.” Id. at 1171. A whistleblower’s 
“discounted losses” are the “potential losses discounted by the likelihood they will occur 
at all.” Id. 
 199 See supra Part III. 
 200 See supra Part IV. 
 201 Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1180. 
 202 “[I]f a bounty program is to avoid” incentivizing citizens to “snitch on their 
neighbors for insignificant transgressions and . . . the administrative costs attendant to 
sifting through such bogus claims, it should encourage . . . informants to come forward 
with information only when (1) the violation is factually and legally clear, and (2) it 
involves a substantial quantity of money.” Id. at 1198.  
 203 See supra note 63. 
 204 SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 6-7. 
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that another person is also reporting a violation that arises out 
of the “same nucleus of operative facts.” Instead, the Dodd-
Frank Act should impose additional threshold requirements.  
One meaningful threshold is a requirement that 
whistleblowers demonstrate the reasonable likelihood that the 
alleged violation will result in sanctions of at least $1 million. 
This requirement is not likely to be particularly cumbersome to 
the potential whistleblower, as an informant is 
able to cheaply discover the maximum and minimum awards for 
which he is potentially eligible, and, unlike an agency, he may know 
approximately how much is at stake in the potential litigation. 
Based on this nonpublic information, an informant should be able to 
estimate with some accuracy whether the government is likely to 
recover a penalty from the defendant.205 
This requirement would discourage whistleblowers from 
reporting trivial claims “just in case” they lead to sanctions of 
over $1 million, thereby reducing administrative costs.206 One 
might argue that there is a threshold consideration in the 
Dodd-Frank Act. The final rules define a whistleblower as one 
who “possess[es] a reasonable belief that the information [he or 
she is] providing relates to a possible securities law 
violation . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to 
occur.”207 Thus, although there is no standard that the 
whistleblower must meet regarding whether or not the claim 
will meet the $1 million minimum, there is arguably a 
threshold consideration as the alleged violation must be a 
“possible” violation. However, in its letter to the SEC, Jones 
Day provided an example of where a “literally true statement 
might relate to a potential violation but not to an actual 
  
 205 Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1183-84.  
 206 Commentators advocated for including a standard of reasonableness in the 
definition of a “whistleblower.” Some recommended that an individual have a 
“reasonable” or “good faith belief” that the information he or she possesses relates to a 
securities law violation. See Jones Day Letter, supra note 109, at 2-3; Letter from 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
at 3 (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with author) (suggesting a requirement for both a 
subjective and objectively reasonable belief of a violation); Letter from Ronald C. Long, 
Dir. Regulatory Affairs, Wells Fargo, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, at 3 (Dec. 17, 2010) (noting that defining whistleblowers as individuals who 
provide information regarding “‘potential violations’ without any threshold defining 
criteria or good faith standard would only serve to frustrate the effective and efficient 
administration of genuine whistleblower claims”). The SEC, however, commented that 
“a higher standard requiring a ‘probable’ or ‘likely’ violation is unnecessary, and would 
make it difficult for the staff to promptly assess whether to accord whistleblower status 
to a submission.” SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 13. 
 207 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2010). 
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violation.”208 For instance, Jones Day presents a scenario where 
a company’s Chief Financial Officer makes optimistic 
statements about the company’s prospects. At the end of the 
financial quarter, however, the company reports disappointing 
results and the company’s stock falls. An employee of the 
company then blows the whistle and alleges that prior to 
making the optimistic statements, the Chief Financial Officer 
made statements during an internal meeting suggesting the 
company faced “significant challenges.”209 Jones Day notes that 
the contrast between the negative internal statements and the 
more optimistic statements may suggest a potential violation of 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.210 The 
whistleblower-employee, however, knows the full context of the 
internal statements and in what respects the company faced 
such challenges. Thus, the full context of the internal 
statements makes it apparent that the Chief Financial Officer 
has not engaged in any misrepresentation. In this scenario, the 
whistleblower-employee’s allegation is “literally true, and it 
relates to a possible violation of the securities laws; but even if 
[the whistleblower-employee] acted in bad faith, she is 
absolutely protected in her employment due to the [SEC’s] 
expansion of the definition of a ‘whistleblower’ to include 
information relating to ‘potential’ violations.”211 In this respect, 
the fact that the SEC requires whistleblowers to bring claims 
regarding “possible” violations will not likely serve as a 
meaningful threshold consideration.  
An additional threshold that legislators should 
implement is a requirement that whistleblowers first report 
the alleged discrepancy to employers’ internal compliance 
systems. Only if the issue is not resolved may the 
whistleblower resort to government assistance. For instance, a 
  
 208 Jones Day Letter, supra note 109, at 3.  
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it is 
unlawful  
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of 
any national securities exchange [t]o effect a short sale . . . [and] [t]o use or 
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on 
a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
 211 Jones Day Letter, supra note 109, at 3. 
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provision similar to section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act 
would provide a more “logical whistleblowing framework.”212 
Under section 10A, auditors who believe they have discovered 
an illegal act at a company are required to report it first to 
company management and the audit committee.213 If the 
company fails to take remedial action, only then is the auditor 
required to report the violation to the SEC.214 As it stands now, 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision is likely to 
“reverse a decade of effort promoting integrity, self-
remediation, and corporate self-reporting.”215 Requiring 
whistleblowers to report first through companies’ internal 
compliance systems would provide senior management with 
the opportunity to remedy the alleged violation, and avoid 
employees’ circumvention of internal compliance programs.216 
The finalized rules provide that a whistleblower’s reward may 
be increased if he or she utilizes the internal compliance 
system.217 However, as displayed in Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., 
this might not always be the most effective means of 
encouraging whistleblowers to use internal compliance 
programs.218 Under the Egan Court’s interpretation, the Dodd-
Frank Act’s whistleblower provision requires whistleblowers to 
report to the SEC in order to receive both protection against 
retaliation219 and their monetary reward.220 As a result, it is 
  
 212 Carton, supra note 107 (quoting former SEC enforcement attorney, Jacob 
Frenkel, and providing that “absent egregious misconduct condoned (or even 
conducted) by senior management, employees have a responsibility to attempt to 
correct errors and misconduct through existing corporate compliance systems”).  
 213 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1) (“If, in the course of conducting an audit . . . the 
registered public accounting firm detects . . . an illegal act . . . the firm shall . . . inform 
the appropriate level of the management of the issuer and assure that the audit 
committee of the issuer . . . is adequately informed with respect to illegal acts that have 
been detected.”). 
 214 Id. § 78j-1(b)(2). “If . . . the registered public accounting firm concludes 
that . . . the senior management has not taken . . . timely and appropriate remedial 
actions with respect to the illegal act . . . the registered public accounting firm shall, as 
soon as practicable, directly report its conclusions to the board of directors.” Id. Once 
the issuer’s board of directors receives the report, it must “inform the [SEC] by notice 
not later than 1 business day after the receipt of such report and shall furnish the 
registered public accounting firm making such report with a copy of the notice 
furnished to the [SEC].” Id. § 78j-1(b)(3). 
 215 Carton, supra note 107 (quoting former SEC enforcement attorney, Jacob 
Frenkel).  
 216 See supra Part III.C.3. 
 217 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-4(c), 240.21F-6(a)(4) (2010). 
 218 See supra Part III.C. 
 219 Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47713, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
 220 Id. at *24 (“Obviously, a whistleblower must directly report to the SEC to 
receive a bounty award from the SEC . . . .”). 
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likely that whistleblowers will bypass internal compliance 
programs. The SEC states that “internal investigations can be 
an important component of corporate compliance . . . [but] 
providing information to persons conducting an internal 
investigation, or simply being contacted by them, may not, 
without more, achieve the statutory purpose of getting high-
quality, original information about securities violations directly 
into the hands of [SEC] staff.”221 However, Congress should 
implement a program that replicates the auditing system 
where the whistleblower first reports the violation internally, 
and receives protection from retaliation, and then reports it to 
the SEC if a certain period of time passes and no remedial 
action has been taken. Such a reporting system would avoid 
the eradication of companies’ internal compliance programs 
and mitigate the issue of threshold considerations,222 thereby 
encouraging only those who have nontrivial claims to come 
forward.  
B. Reduce the Amount of the Mandated Bounties Awarded 
to Eligible Whistleblowers 
Legislators should also reduce the amount of the 
mandated reward given to eligible whistleblowers. The imposition 
of high monetary rewards for violations involving high levels of 
moral outrage is unnecessary and overincentivizes 
whistleblowing.223 Instead, a low, fixed-percentage award provides 
the best route.224 Although a low bounty may affect potential 
whistleblowers’ decisions to report alleged violations, a lower 
reward is not likely to affect whistleblowers’ decisions to report 
cases of serious infractions.225 Instead, a low bounty’s most 
profound effect will likely be limited to whistleblowers’ decisions 
to expose cases involving “insignificant” fraud.226 Even if the 
bounties offered under the Dodd-Frank Act were limited to 5 
  
 221 SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 34.  
 222 Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of 
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 463 (2009). 
 223 See supra Part III.B.  
 224 Ferziger & Currell, supra note 99, at 1197. The authors also propose that 
the ideal whistleblower bounty provision “guarantee[s] that (1) the maximum allowable 
bounty will always be paid where an agency recovers a penalty based on an informant’s 
tip, and (2) the agency will make all possible efforts to maintain an informant’s 
anonymity within the constraints of the litigation process.” Id. 
 225 Id. at 1198.  
 226 Id.  
338 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
percent of sanctions exceeding $1 million, this would guarantee a 
minimum payment of $50,000—hardly an insignificant amount. 
C. Penalize Whistleblowers Who Intentionally Delay 
Reporting the Alleged Violation 
Another concern implicated by the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
whistleblower provision is the fear that whistleblowers may 
intentionally delay reporting violations to increase the amount 
of the resulting sanctions, thereby increasing the amount of 
their reward. To discourage such behavior, lawmakers should 
penalize whistleblowers who unreasonably delay reporting the 
illegality. Research has indicated that penalties are not always 
effective in inducing action.227 Thus, if such a penalty were 
imposed, it should be implemented only in limited circumstances 
where the employer demonstrates that the whistleblower 
unreasonably delayed reporting the violation with the clear 
intent to increase the amount of his reward or to increase his 
chances of satisfying the Dodd-Frank Act’s $1 million minimum. 
The use of a penalty in limited circumstances may prevent 
whistleblowers’ fraudulent behavior while minimizing the 
negative sociological effects of penalties.  
Arguably, whistleblowers are penalized under Dodd-
Frank if they attempt to undermine the integrity of internal 
compliance systems. The SEC provides that a whistleblower’s 
attempts to undermine the company’s internal compliance 
program can decrease the amount of an award.228 However, the 
mere diminution of an award will not be sufficient to deter 
people from acting in this manner. The Dodd-Frank Act 
whistleblower provisions were implemented in hopes to 
“promote effective enforcement of federal securities laws by 
providing incentives for persons with knowledge of misconduct 
to come forward and share their information with the [SEC].”229 
If, however, a whistleblower takes “any steps to undermine the 
integrity of . . . [employers’ internal compliance] systems or 
processes,”230 his or her reward is merely reduced rather than 
eliminated, and this contradicts the goals of the provisions. 
Instead, elimination of the reward is a better option.  
  
 227 Feldman & Lobel, supra note 85, at 1181.  
 228 SEC Final Rules, supra note 108, at 5; 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(3) (2010).  
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CONCLUSION 
Drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to cure the 
defects that many alleged were the contributing factors to the 
2008 financial crisis, including regulatory failure.231 
Commentators, however, have noted that “reform is premature 
when the exact nature and causes of the financial crisis are yet 
to be determined.”232 Legislators, without fully knowing the 
extent and precise causes of the financial crisis, implemented 
provisions calling for comprehensive regulatory reform233 and 
created a broad whistleblower provision within the Dodd-Frank 
Act. As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act fails to provide an 
effective whistleblower program, and instead overincentivizes 
whistleblowing through its expansive whistleblower protection 
and excessive bounties. Instead, legislators should carefully 
examine the incentives and consequences of whistleblowing 
and draft a provision that reflects those findings accordingly. 
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